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Abstract
Recent years have seen a rapidly growing interest in the use of benchmarking 
arrangements to improve policy performance in federal systems.  This is a new 
development and one that is in its very early stages, but there is no doubting its 
significance. At issue here is the intersection of two things: a particular form of 
government and a particular form of management.  Each is a complex matter 
in itself.  How compatible is benchmarking with principles of federalism; and 
to what extent benchmarking can ‘add value’ to existing federal arrangements 
either by offering a superior mode of intergovernmental relations and/or by 
generating better substantive results for citizens? This paper looks at various 
benchmarking experiences in OECD-type federations and the European Union 
and draws tentative conclusions as to how complementary federalism and 
benchmarking might be.
Keywords: Benchmarking; Europe; federal; government; intergovernmental; 
management; performance; policy; OECD.
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Benchmarking in Federal Systems
Alan Fenna
Recent years have seen a rapidly growing interest in the use of benchmarking 
arrangements to improve policy performance in federal systems.  This is a new 
development and one that is in its very early stages, but there is no doubting 
its significance.  If clear indication were lacking, that changed in August 2009 
with the insertion of Article 91d in the German Constitution: “The Federation 
and the States [Länder] may, to establish and improve the performance of their 
administrations, conduct comparative studies and publish the results.”1How 
much legal or practical impact such an ambiguous clause will have is unclear; 
what is clear, though, is its symbolic significance — benchmarking is now a 
recognized device of modern federalism.
At the same time, the issue is far from straightforward.  Only a year after 
the Germans adopted Article 91d, the incoming government of the United 
Kingdom announced that it would wind up its Audit Commission, the body 
that for two decades carried primary responsibility for the bulk of performance 
monitoring and benchmarking of local government in England.2 The 
juxtaposition of these two events suggests something about the complexity 
of the issue: if benchmarking has been called into question in the UK where 
it had been instrumental in driving reform, what is its future in a federal 
context?  At issue here is the intersection of two things: a particular form of 
government and a particular form of management.  Each is a complex matter in 
itself.  The question is how complementary they might be.  How compatible is 
benchmarking with principles of federalism; and to what extent benchmarking 
can ‘add value’ to existing federal arrangements either by offering a superior 
mode of intergovernmental relations and/or by generating better substantive 
results for citizens? In answering these questions one is inevitably drawn 
into consideration of the very different forms that both federalism and 
benchmarking can take.
This chapter provides an overview of the problem considered as four 
propositions: 
1. Benchmarking is a logical but challenging mode of public sector 
governance which comes in different forms and carries with it a number of 
risks or limitations;
2. Federalism is a very specific form of government predicated on 
1. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art 91d: Bund und Länder können 
zur Feststellung und Förderung der Leistungsfähigkeit ihrer Verwaltungen Vergleichsstudien 
durchführen und die Ergebnisse veröffentlichen. Inserted by amendment 1 August 2009.
2.  “Eric Pickles to disband Audit Commission in new era of town hall 
transparency,”London: Ministry of Communities and Local Government, 2010.  The 
decision applies to England only; Scotland and Wales have each had their own 
equivalents.
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well-established norms and promising certain advantages but also one where 
significant differences in practice from one instance to the next make direct 
comparison difficult;
3. In principle, there is a strong affinity between federalism and certain 
types of benchmarking;
4. In practice we find that the experience with benchmarking in federal 
systems has taken various forms depending on what its purpose is; who carries 
it out; how hierarchically it is implemented; and what balance is maintained 
between quantitative and qualitative dimensions.
Challenges of Benchmarking in the Public Sector
‘Benchmarking’ is a term that is used rather loosely and takes on at least 
two somewhat different meanings, one more demanding than the other. 
In the broader sense we can understand benchmarking simply to mean the 
comparative measurement of performance.  In the fuller or more specific sense 
we can understand benchmarking to mean the use of comparative performance 
measurement as a tool for identifying and adopting more efficient or effective 
practices.3  In the former sense it is an assessment device; in the latter it is a 
learning and adjustment tool.
Archetypes: external and internal benchmarking
Benchmarking originated in the private sector, which supplies us with the 
classic model of what the practice is about.  In Type 1 benchmarking, an 
individual firm finds a way to assess performance of some aspect of its enterprise 
against industry leaders in other sectors and learns from that comparison how 
to improve its practices.  The assessed and the assessors are effectively one 
and the same. Such ‘external’ benchmarking is voluntary or self-directed and 
oriented solely toward learning.  
There is another model from the private sector, though, and that is the 
‘internal’ one: central management imposes benchmarking requirements on 
the firm’s constituent units as a way of driving improvement through internal 
competition. This Type 2 benchmarking thus mimics the market forces that 
had been displaced internally by the creation of the business enterprise in the 
first place.  In this version, the assessed and the assessors are different, and 
the former are subject to sanctions imposed by the latter.  This is neither self-
directed nor focused on learning as far as those individual units are concerned; 
rather, it is top-down and coercive, focusing on performance monitoring 
and involving some kind of sanctioning device.  Such internal performance 
monitoring equates to benchmarking in the broad or loose sense of the term.
3. Gregory H. Watson, “A Perspective on Benchmarking,”Benchmarking: an international 
journal 1 (1994):5–10.
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From private to public sector
The evident value of performance comparison, identification of best practice, and 
commitment to learning and improvement makes benchmarking an attractive 
proposition for the public sector as for the private.  In Osborne and Gaebler’soft-
cited argument, “what gets measured gets done,” and if public sector agencies 
start measuring what they do they will find ways to do it better.4 Moreover, 
if governments can shine the spotlight of performance measurement onto the 
things that ultimately count the most –what government achieves as distinct 
from what it merely does– then presumably they will find a way to achieve more.
However, while alike in some regards, the public and private sectors are 
distinctly unalike in others.  Indeed, in two very important respects the 
differences are fundamental.  First, governments and their various agencies are 
not profit-driven enterprises engaged in a competitive struggle for business and 
survival in the market place.  Second, their raison d’être is to achieve impact 
or outcomes in society rather than merely output.  Thus the public sector has 
neither the same imperative nor the same capacity for benchmarking as the 
private sector.
Overcoming the incentives problem
The first of these challenges, the lack of intrinsic incentive, is in some ways 
precisely the reason for introducing benchmarking – just as it has been for 
internal corporate benchmarking.  Performance monitoring and the imposition 
of benchmarking requirements is a public sector surrogate for market forces. 
This may be initiated by an individual agency to improve its own performance 
– external benchmarking – but given the lower level of intrinsic incentive and 
the greater difficulties, such action is likely to be the exception to the rule.  In 
reality, the lower level of incentive means that public sector agencies are more 
likely to need such requirements to be imposed on them. ThusType 2, internal, 
benchmarking is more likely in a public sector environment.
Internal benchmarking operates via sanctions – which, in the private sector, 
appear in the form of decisions about capital allocation.  In that sense, it is a 
coercive device.  In the public sector, sanctions might take a number of forms 
of which two are particularly prominent.  One, following the private sector 
lead, relies on financial penalties and rewards.  There are drawbacks to financial 
penalties, however — among them the distinct possibility that substandard 
performance may require more, not less, resource input to address.  A multi-site 
corporation is free to let its underperforming sites wither and die; governments 
are not.   Hence, then, the attraction of a quite different form of sanction: 
the political device of naming and shaming.  Here the exercise has an external 
audience whom, it is assumed, can be reached effectively and will respond in 
a way that has the desired sanctioning effect.
4. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler. Reinventing Government: how the entrepreneurial 
spirit is transforming the public sector.ReadingMA: Addison-Wesley, 1992. p.146
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Any form of sanctioning creates incentives for behaviour that is perverse 
to the intentions of the benchmarking regime.  Honest efforts to generate 
the desired results as reflected in the measurement criteria may take the form 
of teaching to the test.  In such cases, the overall purpose is forgotten in efforts 
to achieve the measured targets.  Dishonest efforts take the form of gaming, 
whereby the desired indication of results is achieved through manipulation 
without necessarily any improvement in the actual results.  Presumably the 
higher the stakes involved the higher the propensity for perverse behaviour of 
both honest and dishonest forms.
Difficulties of measurement
The second of the challenges and the one that is most particular to the public 
sector – having a focus on outcomes rather than outputs – is less amenable 
to solution.  Private enterprise judges its success by outputs; those outputs all 
have monetary values; and there is no debate about what ultimately the goal 
is.  Private enterprise is not concerned with what its impact might be – if it 
were, clearly many widely available commodities and services would cease to be 
produced.  Government produces outputs, but these outputs are only a means 
to an end, the end of addressing some problem in the economy or society. 
The ultimate goal is outcomes and that presents problems of measurement, 
attribution and direction. Social indicators may exist or be developed for many 
outcomes but with varying difficulty, particularly for outcomes with longer 
time horizons.  Schools should produce children with identifiable and testable 
cognitive skills; but to some degree that is an indicative or intermediate 
outcome. Schools ultimately should produce citizens who over the longer term 
prove to be capable economic agents and well-adjusted members of society. 
The trend toward outcomes-focused benchmarking in the public sector spurs 
greater research on, and investment in, social indicators.5
Even if the outcomes are readily measurable, they may not be so readily 
influenced through policy; to what factors do we attribute performance? Best 
efforts may well fall short of impressive outcomes given the often intractable 
and ‘wicked’ nature of policy challenges.  And, finally, unlike in the private 
sector, there are legitimate differences in views about what outcomes the public 
sector is seeking in many areas.
Of course, there is much utility in measuring public sector outputs and in 
measuring output efficiency.  Even here there are not-insignificant challenges 
given the complexity of many public sector outputs.  The argument of 
benchmarking advocates is that the creation of such regimes prompts and 
promotes the progressive improvement in the data and this seems undeniable. 
One lesson of the UK experience with a performance monitoring reliance 
5. On which, see for example: Tony Atkinson, Bea Cantillon, Eric Marlier and Brian 
Nolan, Social Indicators: the EU and social inclusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002; OECD, ed., Statistics, Knowledge and Policy: key indicators to inform decision 
making. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005.
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on quantitative indicators, though, is that significant qualitative dimensions 
may slip through the net with potential for quite misleading conclusions to 
be drawn.6
Concerning Federalism
There are four points to be made about federalism that are of particular 
relevance to this question. These are: federalism’s distinctiveness as a mode of 
governance; its putative benefits; its operational complexity; and its diversity.
1. The distinctiveness of federalism
First, federalism is not just a formalized system of multi-level governance, but 
a particular form of constitutionalized power-sharing whereby sovereignty is 
in some sense and to some degree shared and powers divided between two 
levels of government, viz., the central government and the governments of 
the constituent units.7  It is predicated on three main tenets.  The first is that 
the two levels have a constitutionally-protected autonomy; neither level can 
unilaterally alter the status or roles of the other.  The second is that constituent 
units have a meaningful degree of responsibility for local matters.  And the 
third is that for matters that affect all, decisions are made nationally not locally. 
Taken together, these last two principles are similar to the European Union’s 
subsidiarity principle: the rule that tasks should be performed by the lowest level 
of government that can execute them effectively.
There are at least two corollaries of these defining principles.  One is that 
the member governments of a federation are accountable first and foremost to 
their own political communities and not to each other or to the wider national 
community.  It is not for the national community to punish or over-rule local 
communities for ‘bad’ policy or politics.  The other is that relations between 
the two levels of government in a federation be conducted in accordance with 
principles of mutual respect.
2. The (putative) benefits of federalism
If that is what federalism is, the second question is what’s federalism for?  Why 
do we have federalism and why should we go on trying to maintain it? 
Federalism has long been seen as offering specific advantages over a unitary 
state. Traditionally, the first of these has been seen as being the protection 
of legitimate difference and the ability to have policy tailored to local needs 
and preferences.  Other advantages now capture greater attention in many 
federations.  Most important of these are the enhancement of policy-learning 
capacity through the multiplication of policy-making sites — so-called 
laboratory federalism — and the ability of citizens to compare the performance of 
6. Nothing But the Truth? London: Audit Commission, 2009.
7.  See Thomas Hueglin and Alan Fenna, Comparative Federalism: a systematic inquiry. 
Peterborough ON: Broadview Press. 2006.
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their government with that of governments in other jurisdictions, or competitive 
federalism. These are, however, theoretical or hypothetical advantages. 
Whether the constructive potential of laboratory or competitive federalism 
is realized — or is realized to an extent that compensates adequately for the 
inevitable disadvantages of divided jurisdiction — is another question.
3. The complexity of federalism
The third point concerns the relationship between theory and practice, and 
in particular the wide gap that tends to exist between federalism in theory and 
federalism as it actually exists.
Federations have evolved into highly complex and messy arrangements 
of political and administrative entanglement which conform only very 
approximately to ideal-typical models.  This is particularly the case for the 
Anglo federations where a constitutional division of powers designed in the 
eighteenth or nineteenth centuries has had to adapt to modern conditions.8 
The consequence is a wide range of policy domains where traditional local 
responsibility has been subject to central government involvement, direction 
or influence.  Taking Australia as a particularly pronounced example, we find 
the Commonwealth (central government) exercising its influence in a wide 
range of policy areas that are constitutionally the domain of the States. In 
an arrangement that is sometimes called ‘cooperative federalism,’ the States 
typically retain administrative responsibility for service delivery but are subject 
to some form of Commonwealth steering.9  This is accomplished using a range 
of mechanisms, but predominant among those are conditional grants.10  The 
availability of that instrument has been made possible by a strong tendency 
toward ‘vertical fiscal imbalance’ (VFI) in the Anglo federations.  Canada 
and the United States have a lower degree of VFI but while the Canadian 
government now makes relatively little use of conditionality in its grants, in 
the United States, transfers are predominantly conditional, or ‘categorical’, 
in nature.11
In most federations, social welfare, education and health care have 
traditionally been a local responsibility but over time they have become 
8.  Alan Fenna, “The Malaise of Federalism: comparative reflections on Commonwealth–
State Relations,”Australian Journal of Public Administration 66 (2007):298–306.
9.  See John M. Williams and Clement MacIntyre, “Commonwealth of Australia,” in 
Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, edited by A. Majeed, 
R. L. Watts and D. M. Brown. Montreal & Kingston: McGill–Queen's University Press, 
2006.
10.  See Alan Fenna, “Commonwealth Fiscal Power and Australia Federalism,“University 
of New South Wales Law Journal 31 (2008):509-29; Alan Morris, “Commonwealth of 
Australia,” in The Practice of Fiscal Federalism: comparative perspectives, edited by A. 
Shah. Montreal & Kingston: McGill–Queen's University Press, 2007.
11.  See Robin Boadway, “Canada,” and William Fox, “United States of America,”in The 
Practice of Fiscal Federalism: comparative perspectives, edited by A. Shah. Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill–Queen's University Press, 2007.
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nationalized to one degree or another and in one form or another.  This has 
happened for a variety of mutually-reinforcing reasons, among them the fact 
that many now have, or are perceived as having, national dimensions that were 
absent previously.  Traditionally regarded as a matter of almost entirely local 
import, education has in recent years, for instance, come to be seen as integral 
to the economic vitality of the nation because of the growing importance of 
human capital to productivity and innovation.
4. The diversity of federal systems and experiences
The fourth and final point is that actually-existing federations each have 
their own distinct character.  Each is unique in a meaningful sense and 
generalisation is difficult.  Even comparing experiences from the five major 
Western federations Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the United 
States raises a number of difficulties. These difficulties escalate when one 
includes the European Union (EU), an important federation-in-the-making. 
The three Anglo federations share some important commonalities.  Most 
importantly, they are all based around the legislative division of powers with 
the two levels, at least ostensibly, exercising full powers of policy-making, 
implementation and administration within their assigned spheres.  This sets 
them apart from the German model that assigns policy-making responsibility 
in many areas to the central government and responsibility for implementation 
and administration to the constituent units, the Länder.12  As a corollary 
of that approach, the German model incorporates a heightened degree of 
representation— via the Bundesrat, or Federal Council — for the constituent 
units in the legislative process of the central government.13
On paper, the similarity between the Australian and American federations 
is particularly strong given the degree to which the Australian founders 
followed the American example in their design and drafting.14  However, 
even among the Anglo federations differences are significant.  Of relevance 
are the fact that the US uses a presidential ‘separation-of-powers’ form of 
government while Canada and Australia are parliamentary systems; the much 
larger number of units in the American system; the distinctiveness of Canada 
as a federation divided between an English-speaking majority and a French-
12. Jutta Kramer, “Federal Republic of Germany,” in Constitutional Origins, Structure, 
and Change in Federal Countries, edited by J. Kincaid and G. A. Tarr. Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill–Queen's University Press, 2005; Hans-PeterSchneider, “The Federal 
Republic of Germany,” in Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal 
Countries, edited by A. Majeed, R. L. Watts and D. Brown. Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill–Queen's University Press, 2006.
13.  Stefan Oeter, “Federal Republic of Germany,” in Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
Governance in Federal Countries, edited by K. Le Roy and C. Saunders. Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill–Queen's University Press, 2006.
14.  Cheryl Saunders, “Commonwealth of Australia,” In Constitutional Origins, Structure, 
and Change in Federal Countries, edited by J. Kincaid and G. A. Tarr. Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill–Queen's University Press, 2005.
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speaking minority centred in one of the main provinces; and the absence of 
any significant underlying federal difference in Australia.  They range from 
the fiscally quite decentralized Canadian case to the highly fiscally centralized 
Australian one. Once we include Germany, Switzerland and the EU, diversity 
increases considerably — and it would increase even further were we to include 
other, less-conventionally structured, federations such as Spain or Belgium.The 
upshot is that one has to make highly contextualized comparisons.
What might benchmarking do for federalism? 
Federalism and benchmarking have, on the face of it, a number of affinities. 
Both are about utilizing multiple experiences to identify better ways of doing 
things; and formalized benchmarking may offer ways to harness the policy 
learning potential of federalism.
Governments as learning enterprises
If we take the original ‘external’ private sector model of benchmarking where 
independent firms initiate comparative assessment of their performance as a 
learning exercise that allows them to incorporate elements of ‘best practice,’ 
then these affinities between benchmarking and federal systems are immediately 
apparent.  We might imagine a federation where the constituent units act 
like improvement-seeking enterprises, perpetually gauging their performance 
against fellow governments and incorporating lessons of experience.  In this 
ideal world, everyone is leveraging themselves up, never reinventing the wheel. 
The real world is not quite like that. The contributing reasons are manifold, 
among which are the following:
• Governments have a suboptimal propensity for experimentation;
• Gauging performance and identifying ‘best practice’ is not always easy;
• Policy objectives are often value-impregnated;
• Governments are under electoral pressure not to engage in open 
self-assessment;
• Mechanisms for cross-jurisdictional learning may be inadequate;
• In many domains there is a homogenizing central government influence.
Seen in that light, the introduction of benchmarking practices and 
requirements could supply the necessary stimulus and mechanism for 
competitive improvement and policy learning.  Governments that voluntarily 
enter into benchmarking agreements —‘benchmarking clubs’ — can create a 
framework in which more systematic evaluation, greater experimentation, and 
enhanced learning occurs.  Given political realities, this is likely to focus on 
aspects of service delivery design rather than policy frameworks.
Limitations on the likelihood of sub-national governments engaging in 
benchmarking of their own volition suggest at least two possible alternatives. 
One is that benchmarking is done by an independent, non-governmental 
institution. The advantage is that independence brings in the potential 
12 Occasional Paper Series Number 6
for neutral assessment.  The advantage of deploying a non-governmental 
institution is that such an arrangementwould not impact on the power 
dynamics of the federal system. However, it also has weaknesses that are the 
reverse of the advantages: such agencies are at the mercy of governments 
from whom they seek information; they have no formal leverage. The other 
alternative, then, is for the task to be executed by an agent with real authority 
— the central government.
What role for the central government?
In the classic federal model, at least that of the Anglo federations, there is little 
legitimate role for the central government in overseeing the activities of the 
constituent units — including via benchmarking.  Sub-national governments 
are accountable for their performance to their own voters, not to the national 
government or the national community.  However, there are a number of 
reasons to relax that stricture.
Most importantly, there is the animating and facilitating role that the 
central government can play in generating an optimal degree of benchmarking 
between the constituent units in areas where they continue to dominate.  Given 
that both laboratory federalism and competitive federalism are goods that are 
almost inevitably in undersupply, there is a constructive role for the central 
government in encouraging experimentation, promoting and coordinating 
comparative performance measurement, and facilitating learning.15
There are also the various programs directed and funded to one degree 
or another by the central government that operate in areas of sub-national 
jurisdiction.  Benchmarking in those contexts represents an alternative mode of 
coordination that potentially exchanges ‘micro-management’ type controls for 
a set of incentives that focus on what policy is ultimately all about: outcomes. 
Potentially, a switch from input and outputs to a focus on outcomes would 
encourage experimentation and learning in the effort to find more effective 
and efficient means to ends at the service delivery level.
What do we find?
In practice, we find a wide range of benchmarking experiences in federal 
countries — although in almost all countries the use of benchmarking is to 
date rather fragmentary.  Some experiences exemplify the federal ethos; some 
of them represent the continuation of un-federal practices by new means; 
all of them raise questions about efficacy and the translation of performance 
measurement into policy learning.  In a number of cases it is very early days. 
Three general approaches can be identified: monitoring by independent 
agencies; coercive, top-down monitoring; and collegial benchmarking.
15. As argued, for instance, in Shelley K. Metzenbaum, Strategies for Using State Infor-
mation: measuring and improving program performance.  IBM Center for the Business of 
Government, University of Maryland, 2003.
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Independent monitoring
In a number of countries, performance monitoring of constituent units has 
been, or is being done, by non-governmental organisations or institutions.  In 
the United States the Pew Center carries out a periodic ‘Grading the States’ 
exercise.16 Summary assessment is presented in ‘report card’ or ‘league table’ style 
using a twelve point scale with information made publicly available through 
website presentation.  In the most recent iteration, grades ranged from A- at the 
top to D+ at the bottom.  The assessment criteria are fiscal condition, human 
resources management, infrastructure provision and information technology. 
In its performance assessment of the States, the Pew Center highlights the use 
of performance measurement by state governments as, in turn, an important 
contributor to success.17 In Germany, a similar assessment is carried out by 
the private-sector Bertelsmann Foundation, focusing particularly on fiscal 
performance.18 In Switzerland, a university-based institute, the Databank on 
Swiss Cantons and Municipalities, creates performance comparisons on a range 
of fiscal and governance indicators.19  It also seeks to make its assessments 
widely available through website presentation.
Such independent monitoring has evident advantages and disadvantages. 
By their unobtrusive nature and disinterested focus on strengths and 
weaknesses across jurisdictions, such exercises are entirely consonant with 
federalism and contribute a degree of comparative performance assessment 
that would otherwise be lacking.  This should contribute to both laboratory 
and competitive federalism.  But how much impact do such exercises have? 
Operating to a large extent with freely available data, independent monitoring 
may end up measuring things not because they are important or revealing but 
simply because the data exist and are available.  Having no ownership of the 
exercise, governments may also disregard the findings.
Coercive monitoring
At the other extreme are cases where the central government uses internal 
benchmarking much as a large business enterprise would with its operating 
units: as a means of driving performance improvement through sanctions. 
Such exercises may represent the continuance in new forms of traditional 
16.  See Grading the States 2008 at: <http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/gpp_report_
card.aspx>.
17.  Top ranked Virginia, the report says for instance, “uses state and agency strategic 
plans to achieve social goals by linking program and managerial performance measures.  
These measures are tracked online so that the public can easily see the results”.
18. See, for example: Norbert Berthold, Norbert, Matthias Kullas, and Andreas Műller, 
Die Bundesländer im Standortwettbewerb. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007; 
Uwe Wagschal, Ole Wintermann, and Thieß Petersen, Konsolidierungsstrategien der 
Bundesländer: Verantwortung fűr die Zukunft Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009.
19. Base de données des cantons et des villes suisses (BADAC), at the Institute of 
Advanced Studies in Public Administration (IDHEAP) in Lausanne.
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centralizing trends in federal systems whereby the national government uses 
particular constitutional powers or fiscal superiority to achieve a de facto 
alteration in the division of powers and responsibilities or the application 
of a new mode of governance to an existing division of functions between 
national and sub-national governments. Neither version has been without its 
difficulties.
In Switzerland, the implementation of performance benchmarking between 
the Confederation and the cantons in the area of employment services seems 
to have been largely unsuccessful as a result of resistance to the sanctioning 
arrangements.20 In Australia, the Commonwealth has launched the My School 
website providing online reporting of student results in national testing, on 
a school-by-school basis, of results despite the fact that schooling falls within 
State-government jurisdiction.21
The most prominent example of coercive benchmarking comes, though, 
from the United States. The U.S. government’s No Child Left BehindAct of 2001 
(NCLB)22effected a major shift of control over primary and secondary schooling 
away from the States who traditionally exercised almost all responsibility in 
the field.23 This brought the States explicitly into the ambitious performance 
management fold that Congress had initiated for federal government agencies 
with passage of the Government and Performance Results Act in 1993.  NCLB was 
unilaterally developed and imposed on the States as an extension of Congress’s 
traditional conditional (‘categorical’) grant approach to extending its reach 
to matters within State jurisdiction. Resistance was significant and for reasons 
pertaining to federalism and to the difficulties of governing by performance 
measurement, many commentators regard achievements as small.24
Collegial monitoring and benchmarking
In between these two extremes of independent and top-down monitoring 
is a third model: more collegial-style monitoring carried out on the basis of 
intergovernmental agreement and cooperation between constituent units 
20. ChristopherHilbert, “Implementation of Performance Measurement in Public 
Employment Services in Switzerland,” in The Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies: 
measures, public private partnerships and benchmarking edited by J. De Koning. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2007.
21. See www.myschool.edu.au.
22. An Act to Close the Achievement Gap with Accountability, Flexibility, and Choice, so that 
No Child is Left Behind.
23. See: Paul Manna, School's in: federalism and the national education agenda. Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006; Patrick J. McGuinn, No Child Left Behind and 
the Transformation of Federal Educational Policy, 1965–2005. Lawrence KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 2006; Kenneth Wong, “Toward Federalizing Education Policy,” Publius 40 
(2009): 226–233.
24.  For example: Beryl A.Radin, Challenging the Performance Movement: accountability, 
complexity, and democratic values. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006; 
Diane Ravitch, “Time to Kill 'No Child Left Behind',” Education Week.
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in some federations.   The central government is also typically involved — 
playing, however, a more facilitative role.  The audience may be primarily 
the governments themselves, or it may be the community more broadly.  The 
leading example of this is Australia’sReport on Government Services (ROGS), 
now in its fifteenth year of publication.  A steering committee representing 
all governments establishes the performance monitoring framework and 
overseas publication of the Report. An arm’s-length research agency of the 
Commonwealth government, the Productivity Commission, acts as the node 
of the exercise: serving as secretariat, compiling the data and producing the 
reports.  While ROGS does not cover everything State governments are 
involved in doing, it does cover an ambitiously wide range of public services 
making up a substantial part of State government activity.  
There is no real equivalent to ROGS in other federations, though one can 
find similar arrangements operating on a sector-specific basis.  In Switzerland, 
for instance, the Confederation’ Office of Regional Development facilitates 
cantonal performance monitoring in the area of sustainability policy. The 
central government’s role in this instance is limited, it would seem, to promoting 
data quality and thus utility — in particular to promote the comparability of 
data generated on a local basis.  In Canada, the federal government acts as a 
node for a similar exercise in the area of health and hospital services via the 
Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI).  
The question to be asked of these various instances of collegial benchmarking 
is how effectively their increasingly sophisticated generating and aggregating 
of performance data feeds back into policy learning and service delivery 
improvement in the individual jurisdictions.  In other words, to what extent 
does performance monitoring actually translate into true benchmarking?  The 
focus in all three of the cases noted here is on quantitative indicators and 
comparative performance measurement; mechanisms for qualitative learning 
are absent or very much secondary.  This brings us to the European Union’s 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC).
The EU has developed the OMC as a mode of policy coordination for 
application in areas where it lacks jurisdiction.25  The OMC is described as a 
form of ‘soft law’ in contradistinction to the ‘hard law’ that the EU exercises 
via its ‘directives.’  Prominent among those policy domains where the EU lacks 
authority are the institutions of the welfare state, education systems and labour 
market programs – in other words social policy broadly conceived.  These 
were originally seen as incidental to the EU’s main objective of promoting 
economic dynamism through economic integration, but they are now regarded 
as essential factors in economic performance.
Under the Lisbon Strategy proclaimed in 2000, the EU will pursue 
improvement in those policy areas by establishing performance measurement 
and benchmarking frameworks, engaging in evaluation and peer review and 
25.  See, for example, Luc Tholoniat, “The Career of the Open Method of Coordination: 
lessons from a 'soft' EU instrument,”West European Politics 33 (2010):93–117.
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encouraging mutual learning.  Thus the OMC was designed to have strong and 
complementary quantitative and qualitative dimensions, to be voluntary, and 
to promote contextualized learning – that is, learning based on recognition 
of the different circumstances and different cultural and institutional orders 
prevailing in different jurisdictions. Considerable emphasis is placed on 
detailed peer review exercises that focus on the qualitative dimension necessary 
for inter-jurisdictional learning to take place.
Dissatisfaction with the OMC’s limited impact led after a few years to the 
recommendation that it switch to a “naming, shaming and faming” approach 
in the form of a league tables style of ranking  that would more aggressively 
cajole Member States into adopting best practices.26  That recommendation 
was rejected and there is little reason to think that it would have been 
successful.  While the OMC epitomizes the federal principle of cooperation, 
mutual respect, autonomous accountability and improvement through mutual 
learning, its substantive impact remains much debated.27
Conclusion
Federalism and benchmarking are enjoying a tentative, exploratory, relationship 
that is partly based in good faith attempts to fulfil some of federalism’s 
potential as a learning-oriented governance arrangement and partly reflective 
of long-running centralisation dynamics.  Both logic and evidence suggest 
that best-practice oriented ‘external’ benchmarking will be very much an 
undersupplied good in both the public sector in general and federal systems in 
particular.  Central governments would thus seem to have an important role to 
play in facilitating cooperation of that nature.   Benchmarking may also offer 
an administratively and substantively superior alternative to more directive 
modes of centralized policy making in federal systems.  However, there are 
real challenges involved in generating reliable and genuinely indicative data; 
in relating outputs to outcomes; to identifying and incorporating practice 
improvements; and in employing sanctions. The nature of those challenges 
places a premium on cooperative and collaborative processes.
26. Wim Kok, Facing the Challenge: the Lisbon strategy for growth and employment (2004).
27.  Martin Heidenreich and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds. Changing European Employment 
and Welfare Regimes: the influence of the open method of coordination on national 
reforms. London: Routledge, 2009; Sandra Kröger, “The Effectiveness of Soft Governance 
in the Field of European Anti-Poverty Policy: operationalization and empirical 
evidence,”Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 11 (2009):197–211.
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